Re-acceleration?

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Chief Global Macro Strategist



April 2024


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NDR's 10 Rules of Research


1	Be Objective	6	Don't Fight the Fed
2	Be Disciplined	7	Beware of the Crowd at Extremes
3	Be Flexible (and humble)	8	Those who do not study history are condemned to repeat its mistakes
4	Be Risk Averse	9	Apply Money Management Rules: primarily cut your losses and let your profits run
5	Don't Fight the Tape	10	Don't fight the government (e.g., fiscal policy)

NDR utilizes a 360 degree approach.



Economy

With 525 bp of rate hikes and an inverted curve, why is the economy growing above-trend? Fiscal stimulus is one reason.




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
	Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA)(1)	Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)(2)	CHIPS Act(3)	Total Spending	Total Revenue	Deficit
2022	4,133	0	0	4,133	8,079	-3,946
2023	10,041	26,766	2,325	39,132	42,653	-3,521
2024	32,045	25,888	5,583	63,516	19,712	43,804
2025	41,896	21,016	8,022	70,934	1,398	69,536
2026	64,358	18,878	9,433	92,669	-5,497	98,166
2027	58,741	7,815	8,577	75,133	6,536	68,597
2028	44,432	-15,160	7,050	36,322	9,866	26,456
2029	29,109	-19,889	5,733	14,953	10,014	4,939
2030	22,133	-31,183	4,640	-4,410	9,929	-14,339
2031	-1,063	-37,592	3,711	-34,944	9,773	-44,717
2022-2026	152,475	92,547	25,363	270,385	66,339	204,046
2022-2031	305,829	-3,462	55,074	357,441	112,460	244,981


Notes: CBO cost estimates as of: (1) August 9 2021, (2) August 5, 2022, and (3) July 21, 2022. Source: Congressional Budget Office

Ned Davis Research

Rate hikes less effective in U.S. Consumers have jobs and income.









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Other economies stagnate with below-trend growth.




Can we get back to 2%? We'll get close. Lag

We'll get close. Lagged effects from house prices and multifamily supply should cool rent growth.




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Maybe inflation was mostly transitory. Commodities firming.



But the intermediate-term outlook continues to be bedeviled by supply side challenges:


- Housing
- Commodities
- Security over efficiency (defense, energy, food, supply chain, etc.)




• Labor


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
Regime analysis and SAA Guard against accelerating inflation.






Growth is good for risk assets. Guard against contraction.





10

Combining inflation and growth regimes for asset allocation.



New report for asset allocation and selection! Newest version (below) now live.



Financial and Alternative Asset Performance During Growth and Inflation Regimes

Report: B0705.RPT

• Run Date: 2024-04-05

As of 2024-03-31

Click <u>here</u> for an explanation guide. Click <u>here</u> for a brief video walkthrough.

Asset Universe VBD Bond Secto U.S. Municipal St S&P 500 Sectors	rs ectors	: Growth and Inflation	Create Report				Advanced Op	tions					
S&P 500 by Divid	lend		% of Time										
Stock Cap and Style R Commercial Real Es REIT Sectors Commodities		Bonds	Gold	Commodities	<u>T-Bills</u>	<u>REITs</u>	CRE	RRE	<u>Hedge</u> <u>Funds</u>	<u>Private</u> <u>Credit</u>	<u>Custom</u> Portfolio	Since Jul 1972	<u>Custom</u> <u>Portfolio</u>
Growth Rising, Inflation Rising	9.	<u>2 7.8</u>	24.3	<u>20.0</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>21.2</u>	2.5*	<u>-0.0</u>	<u>8.3</u>	15.1*	<u>5.9</u>	2.7	1.8
Growth Rising, Inflation Neutral	<u>16</u>	<u>8 3.6</u>	<u>-1.5</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>15.4</u>	<u>7.6</u>	<u>6.9</u>	<u>11.3</u>	<u>10.8</u>	<u>11.7</u>	21.3	21.5
Growth Rising, Inflation Falling	<u>28</u> .	<u>8 10.3</u>	<u>-8.8</u>	<u>6.4</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>27.1</u>	<u>4.7</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>17.7</u>	12.7*	<u>21.4</u>	11.8	11.9
Growth Stable, Inflation Rising	<u>6</u> .	<u>8 3.8</u>	<u>17.8</u>	<u>33.9</u>	<u>4.9</u>	<u>6.8</u>	<u>14.2</u>	<u>9.2</u>	<u>13.1</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>5.7</u>	14.8	15.0
Growth Stable, Inflation Neutra	13.	<u>8 5.5</u>	<u>5.3</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>10.5</u>	<u>10.9</u>	<u>5.9</u>	<u>11.3</u>	<u>10.3</u>	<u>10.6</u>	20.0	20.2
Growth Stable, Inflation Falling	<u>16</u>	<u>4</u> <u>13.7</u>	<u>-3.5</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>7.2</u>	<u>16.3</u>	<u>11.2</u>	<u>7.3</u>	<u>19.1</u>	10.2*	<u>15.3</u>	8.4	8.5
Growth Falling, Inflation Rising	<u>-3</u>	<u>2</u> <u>4.7</u>	30.2	<u>19.8</u>	<u>7.1</u>	<u>-14.2</u>	<u>9.7</u>	<u>-0.2</u>	<u>12.9</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>0.3</u>	11.0	11.1
Growth Falling, Inflation Neutra	I <u>-1</u> .	<u>4</u> <u>10.5</u>	<u>12.8</u>	<u>-24.6</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>15.4</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>3.9</u>	6.1	6.2
Growth Falling, Inflation Falling	<u>-15</u>	<u>7</u> <u>10.1</u>	21.4	<u>-41.3</u>	<u>5.9</u>	<u>-24.8</u>	<u>-9.0</u>	<u>-4.5</u>	<u>-4.2</u>	0.1*	<u>-4.5</u>	3.9	3.9
All Time	10.	<u>8 6.5</u>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>9.1</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>5.3</u>	<u>11.3</u>	<u>9.5</u>	<u>9.4</u>		
Time-Series Chart	Chart	Chart	Chart	<u>Chart</u>	<u>Chart</u>	Chart	<u>Chart</u>	<u>Chart</u>	<u>Chart</u>	Chart	Chart		

Report Notes:

Custom Portfolio: S&P 500 = 60.0%, Bonds = 40.0%, Rebalanced Yearly (Analysis period: Jan 1973 to Feb 2024)

S&P 500 = S&P 500 Total Return (Analysis period: Jul 1972 to Feb 2024; Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices)

Bonds = Bloomberg Float Adjusted U.S. Agg (Analysis period: Jan 1973 to Feb 2024; Source: Bloomberg Barclays Indices)

Gold = Spot Gold (Analysis period: Jul 1972 to Feb 2024; Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P.)

Commodities = S&P GSCI Total Return (Analysis period: Jul 1972 to Feb 2024; Source: S&P GSCI)

T-Bills = Treasury Bill Total Return (Analysis period: Jul 1972 to Feb 2024; Source: Ned Davis Research, Inc.)

REITs = NAREIT All-REIT (Analysis period: Jul 1972 to Feb 2024; Source: NAREIT)

CRE = NCREIF NPI (Analysis period: Dec 1977 to Dec 2023; Source: NCREIF.com)

RRE = S&P Core Logic Case Shiller HPI (Analysis period: Jan 1975 to Dec 2023; Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices and CoreLogic)

Hedge Funds = BarclaysHedge Hedge Fund Index (Top 50 Managed Futures index 1987-1996, CTA Index prior to 1987) (Analysis period: Dec 1979 to Jan 2024; Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P.)

Private Credit = Cliffwater Direct Lending Index (Analysis period: Sep 2004 to Sep 2023; Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P.)

 * Histogram not available for assets with 6 or fewer returns in a regime

Monetary conditions and 1st rate cuts

Yields have always fallen going into the first cut.

	asury (First Cut)											
First Out	Value	BP Change										
<u>First Cut</u> <u>Date</u>	<u>value</u> <u>(%)</u>	252 days before	189 days before	126 days before	63 days before	63 days after	126 days after	189 days after	252 days after			
1970-11-13	7.00	-13	-15	-80	-71	-89	-43	-59	-123			
1971-11-19	5.79	-69	-39	-70	-69	27	31	42	45			
1974-12-09	7.40	69	31	-8	-64	18	37	100	79			
1980-05-30	10.25	120	104	-9	-247	164	247	337	321			
1981-11-02	14.57	211	159	-12	-38	-10	-70	-106	-401			
1984-11-21	11.39	-20	-60	-233	-130	37	-75	-129	-181			
1989-06-06	8.36	-66	-63	-77	-90	-17	-54	23	11			
1995-07-06	6.05	-125	-172	-183	-107	7	-40	22	73			
1998-09-29	4.59	-151	-117	-108	-85	12	66	122	138			
2001-01-03	5.14	-135	-76	-85	-73	-20	30	-52	-4			
2007-09-18	4.50	-30	-10	-6	-59	-30	-112	-34	-109			
2019-07-31	2.02	-96	-106	-68	-50	-18	-45	-138	-147			
Mean	7.25	-25	-30	-78	-90	7	-2	11	-25			
Median	6.53	-48	-49	-74	-72	-1	-41	-6	4			

Source: Federal Reserve Board

Extracted from BMS_598.RPT

Stocks almost always post decent gains over an easing cycle.

<u>Start Date</u>	End Date	<u>Length (Calendar Days)</u>	<u>Start Value</u>	End Value	<u>% Change</u>	<u>GPA %</u>				
1970-11-13	1971-02-19	98	83.37	96.74	16.04	74.02				
1971-11-19	1971-12-17	28	91.61	100.26	9.44	224.19				
1974-12-09	1976-11-22	714	65.60	102.59	56.39	25.68				
1980-05-30	1980-07-28	59	111.24	121.43	9.16	71.98				
1981-11-02	1982-12-15	408	124.20	135.24	8.89	7.92				
1984-11-21	1986-08-21	638	164.52	249.67	51.76	26.95				
1989-06-06	1992-09-04	1,186	324.24	417.08	28.63	8.06				
1995-07-06	1996-01-31	209	553.99	636.02	14.81	27.27				
1998-09-29	1998-11-17	49	1,049.02	1,139.32	8.61	84.98				
2001-01-03	2003-06-25	903	1,347.56	975.32	-27.62	-12.25				
2007-09-18	2014-10-31	2,600	1,519.78	2,018.05	32.79	4.06				
2019-07-31	2022-03-15	958	2,980.38	4,262.45	43.02	14.60				
Mean					20.99	46.46				
Median					15.42	26.32				


S&P 500 Total Return (Over Cycle)

Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices


Extracted from BMS_598.RPT

My top 3 macro risks

Policy stays restrictive for too long. A weak USD keeps inflation sticky.




Government Spending stimulative, but who will buy the debt?



Data through 2023-12-31 Annualized Growth in U.S. Treasury Debt Ownership During Periods of Quantitative Tightening 2017-09-30 to 2019-09-30 Source: Federal Reserve Board 60 60 56.5% Growth in U.S. Treasury Debt (Dotted Line) = 9.3% 55 55 50 50 45 45 40 40 35 35 32.1% 30 30 25 25 22.8% 22.1% 20 20 15 15 12.8% 12.3% 10.0% 10 10 7.9% - - 8.2% 5 5 2.3% 0.3% 0 0 -5 -5 -3.4% -5.5% Level as of 2019-09-30, in billions -10 -10 \$2,366 \$1,102 \$372 \$1,146 \$127 \$4,711 \$872 \$365 \$434 \$1,494 \$909 \$1,048 \$244 \$1,552 -15 -15 140 140 Since 2022-06-30 130 128.9% 130 Growth in U.S. Treasury Debt (Dotted Line) = 7.5% 120 120 110 110 100 100 90 90 79.0% 80 80 70 70 60 60 50 50 40 40 34.1% 30 30 22.9% 18.2% 18.8% 20 20 10.69 10 10 0 -10 -10 -5.3% -5.8% -10.7% -20 -14.2% -20 Level as of 2023-12-31, in billions -30 -30 \$4,415 \$816 \$477 \$1,138 \$205 \$6,063 \$1,746 \$440 \$613 \$1,891 \$1,652 \$2,269 \$300 \$2,321 All Other S/L + GSE Gov't Federal China Non-Fin Private MMMF House-Insurers Japan Funds + Banks Security Reserve Business Countries Pensions Pensions ETFs Dealers holds © Copyright 2024 NDR, Inc. Further distribution prohibited without prior permission. **B920F** All Rights Reserved. See NDR Disclaimer at www.ndr.com/copyright.html For data vendor disclaimers refer to www.ndr.com/vendorinfo.

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Neutral duration. Yields too high over the Rates, curve and credit short-term but not the intermediate-term.




Yield curve steepened going into first rate cut.


- 10-3 Spread	(First Cut)										
<u>First Cut</u> <u>Date</u>	<u>Value</u>	BP Change									
		252 days before	189 days before	126 days before	63 days before	63 days after	126 days after	189 days after	252 days after		
1970-11-13	50	108	105	59	35	53	-13	-23	-2		
1971-11-19	45	-23	-83	0	14	43	11	0	-14		
1974-12-09	27	34	30	83	73	65	51	-7	28		
1980-05-30	97	113	123	123	225	-82	-194	-152	-186		
1981-11-02	13	64	63	113	115	-35	-38	22	23		
1984-11-21	70	1	-12	2	50	32	43	26	13		
1989-06-06	-4	-81	-45	-8	8	-11	13	7	13		
1995-07-06	41	-45	-31	36	10	-11	-2	-3	1		
1998-09-29	18	-4	15	12	23	-7	0	4	4		
2001-01-03	22	7	61	46	30	45	72	124	131		
2007-09-18	46	45	49	41	35	49	124	51	104		
2019-07-31	18	-3	-5	-3	-6	1	2	22	23		
Mean	37	18	23	42	51	12	6	6	12		
Median	34	4	23	39	32	16	6	6	13		

Source: Federal Reserve Board


Extracted from BMS_598.RPT

Credit still hanging tough.







Loans relatively attractive short-term.



Significant underweight to Japan.





Stocks Bond yields would need to rise to become attractive relative to stocks.




For data vendor disclaimers refer to www.ndr.com/vendorinfo/


Breadth thrust fades. Optimism retreating.





Spring vulnerability.





Positive months from November-February have historically carried on through the rest of the year.


Month Ending	Nov (%)	Dec (%)	Jan (%)	Feb (%)	3 Months Later (%)	6 Months Later (%)	9 Months Later (%)	10 Months Later (%)	12 Months Later (%)
2/29/1936	3.9	3.7	6.6	1.7	-1.0	9.9	18.8	18.1	24.3
2/28/1945	0.4	3.5	1.4	6.2	5.0	8.5	20.2	21.4	24.3
2/28/1950	0.1	4.4	1.7	1.0	9.1	7.0	13.3	18.5	26.6
2/28/1954	0.9	0.2	5.1	0.3	11.6	14.1	30.9	37.6	40.6
2/28/1955	8.1	5.1	1.8	0.4	3.1	17.5	23.8	23.7	23.3
2/28/1961	4.0	4.6	6.3	2.7	4.9	7.3	12.4	12.8	10.3
2/28/1971	4.7	5.7	4.1	0.9	3.0	2.4	-2.9	5.5	10.2
2/28/1983	3.6	1.5	3.3	1.9	9.7	11.0	12.4	11.4	6.1
2/28/1986	6.5	4.5	0.2	7.2	9.0	11.5	9.8	6.7	25.2
2/28/1991	6.0	2.5	4.2	6.7	6.2	7.7	2.2	13.6	12.4
2/28/1993	3.0	1.0	0.7	1.1	1.5	4.6	4.2	5.2	5.4
2/29/1996	4.1	1.7	3.3	0.7	4.5	1.8	18.2	15.7	23.5
2/28/1998	4.5	1.6	1.0	7.0	4.0	-8.8	10.9	17.1	18.0
2/29/2004	0.7	5.1	1.7	1.2	-2.1	-3.6	2.5	5.9	5.1
2/28/2013	0.3	0.7	5.0	1.1	7.7	7.8	19.2	22.0	22.8
2/28/2017	3.4	1.8	1.8	3.7	2.0	4.6	12.0	13.1	14.8
2/29/2024	8.9	4.4	1.6	5.2	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Mean	3.7	3.1	2.9	2.9	4.9	6.4	13.0	15.5	18.1
Median	3.8	3.0	2.5	1.5	4.7	7.5	12.4	14.6	19.4
% Positive	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	87.5	87.5	93.8	100.0	100.0
All Periods Mean	1.0	1.3	1.1	-0.1	2.0	4.0	6.1	6.8	8.2

Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices


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
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Tech and cyclicals showing leadership globally.




My biggest macro trade **Short USD** - Overvalued, sentiment bullish. Declining confidence in U.S. institutions.







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Gold – A strong USD, rising real rates, and bullish positioning should hurt gold. Gold now rising on geopolitical risks and the new world order.







Foreign stocks - U.S. still in uptrend. Foreign markets range-bound except China-related. A stronger Chinese recovery could help everyone.



CRE woes arriving Market has yet to clear. NYCB shows more problems out there.




U.S. Distressed Sale Pairs Percentage, Data Through December 2023



Source: CoStar

Time to start sniffing around for REITs?



Bottom Line

- U.S. economy fine, global economy recovering. Difficult to get back to 2% inflation. The coming years will feel stagflationary with below-trend growth and above-target inflation.
- Regime analysis can be useful for asset allocation and selection.
- First rate cuts have been bullish.
- Neutral duration. Look for steeper curve. Credit hanging tough. UW Japan.
- Bonds not as compelling as equities.
- The USD should drive asset returns in the coming years.
 Gold, commodities, foreign stocks, and foreign bonds should benefit from a weaker USD.
- Risks around staying too restrictive for too long, a weak USD, QT, Treasury supply, and CRE.



For global asset allocation, NDR recommends an overweight allocation to stocks and underweight allocations to bonds and cash. Our recommendations are in-line with our Global Balanced Account Model.

Equity Allocation

U.S.] Our U.S. asset allocation recommendation is 65% stocks (10% overweight), 30% bonds (5% underweight), and 5% cash (5% underweight). On an absolute basis, we are overweight the S&P 500. We favor small-caps over large-caps and are neutral on Growth versus Value.

INTERNATIONAL | We are overweight the U.S., underweight the U.K. and Pacific ex. Japan, and marketweight on all other regions.

Macro

ECONOMY | The global economy has shown notable resilience, with recession chances waning. Risks include monetary and fiscal policy uncertainty, sticky inflation, and easing Chinese growth.

FIXED INCOME | We reduced our exposure to 100% of benchmark duration, and

recommend curve steepeners. We are overweight MBS and underweight CMBS and ABS.

We are marketweight everything else.

GOLD | We are currently bullish.

DOLLAR | We are currently neutral.



Global Asset Allocation • Overweight • Marketweight • Underweight

- Stocks (70%)
 -)

Bonds (30%) | Cash (0%)

Benchmark: Stocks (55%), Bonds (35%), Cash (10%)

Equities — Regional Relative Allocation

- United States (67%)
- Europe ex. U.K. (13%) | Emerging Markets (10%) | Japan (5%) | Canada (2%)
- U.K. (2%) | Pacific ex Japan (1%)

Benchmark – U.S. (61.5%), Europe ex. U.K. (12.5%), Emerging Markets (10.8%), Japan (5.5%), U.K. (3.8%), Pacific ex. Japan (3%), Canada (3%)

Global Bond Allocation

- Europe (32%) | U.K. (7%)
- U.S. (54%)
- Japan (7%)

Benchmark: U.S. (55%), Europe (27%), Japan (13%), U.K. (5%)

U.S. Allocation

- Stocks (65%) | Small-Cap
- Growth | Value | Mid-Cap
 - Bonds (30%) | Cash (5%) | Large-Cap

Benchmark: Stocks (55%), Bonds (35%), Cash (10%)

Sectors

- Financials (16%)
- Consumer Staples (4%) | Real Estate (1%)

Benchmark: Technology (28.1%), Health Care (13.0%), Financials (12.3%), Communication Services (8.9%), Consumer Discretionary (10.9%), Consumer Staples (7.0%), Industrials (8.5%), Energy (4.1%), Utilities (2.3%), Real Estate (2.4%), Materials (2.4%)

U.S. Bonds — 100% of Benchmark Duration



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Joseph Kalish Chief Global Macro Strategist

Joseph Kalish is the Chief Global Macro Strategist for Ned Davis Research Group. He has been following and studying financial and economic trends for over 40 years. He and the Macro team are responsible for all of the firm's bond and economic analysis.

Joe authors several publications. He writes on global and U.S. fixed income strategy and trends twice a week. Joe is a regular contributor to other macro publications, including **Featured Reports**, the **U.S. Economic Focus**, and the **U.S. Daily Economic Perspectives**.

The Macro team also assists the firm's equity strategists by identifying relevant monetary and economic trends, fundamental themes, and providing historical market perspectives. They collaborate with the Global Strategy team and provide economic analysis through global and regional commentary. They also work closely with the U.S. Strategy team in helping to formulate the economic outlook for the major sectors of the economy. In recent years, Joe has been particularly focused on credit trends and credit-sensitive sectors of the economy, including residential and commercial real estate and banking, and has written extensively on these topics.

In addition to the bond and economic analysis, Joe has held a number of other positions since joining the company in July 1986 including: editor of **Industry Watch** (an analysis of equity group trends), editor of **Techno-Fundamental Ranks** (a stock screening service), and associate editor of **Stock Market Strategy**. Joe was also a portfolio manager and trader for an equity mutual fund for five years.

Joe is a member of the National Association for Business Economics. He is regularly quoted and interviewed by the financial media in the U.S. and internationally, and is a featured speaker at investment conferences.

Joe received his Bachelor of Science degree in Information Systems Management **cum laude** from the University of Maryland and his Master of Business Administration degree in Finance, with distinction, from Stern School of Business of New York University.

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
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